Freedom & Progress

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., writing in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, argues that the United States needs to adopt a new strategy in fighting the War in Iraq, specifically a strategy based in principles of counterinsurgency warfare. Mr. Krepinevich convincingly attributes the difficulties in prosecuting the Iraq War to a combination of a clear lack of post-war planning on the part of the Pentagon and Bush Administration, a cultural history of inter-tribal violent struggle within the Iraqi society and al-Qaeda's strategic decision to make Iraq the major theater in its war against the United States.

Mr. Krepinevich argues that the Coalition forces ought to abandon the current strategy of hunting down and killing pockets of insurgents, and replace it with what Krepinevich refers to as "oil-spot strategy":

Rather than focusing on killing insurgents, they should concentrate on providing security and opportunity to the Iraqi people, thereby denying insurgents the popular support they need. Since the U.S. and Iraqi armies cannot guarantee security to all of Iraq simultaneously, they should start by focusing on certain key areas and then, over time, broadening the effort -- hence the image of an expanding oil spot.

This counterinsurgency theory, of course, rejects the Rumsfeldian approach of a smaller, more mobile and tactile force of American military for the 21st Century. Freedom & Progress welcomes such rejection. It is time for Secretary Rumsfeld to step aside and allow new leadership and fresh thinking to prevail as the United States determines what course of action is best to decisively win the War in Iraq.

Indeed, a clear victory over the twin forces of the insurgency and al-Qaeda is the only clear objective for the Coalition forces in fighting the Iraq War. Moreover, victory is an objective necessary (though admittedly not sufficient) to further the American policy of bringing democracy as well as stability in the greater Middle East.

Thus, those who champion ending the War effort now, and admitting defeat, are misguided by their desire for peace. As Krepinevich concludes, "[T]he costs of such premature disengagement would likely be calamitous. The insurgency could morph into a bloody civil war, with the significant involvement of both Syria and Iran. Radical Islamists would see the U.S. departure as a victory, and the ensuing chaos would drive up oil prices."